 | We are troubled on every side, yet not distressed; we are perplexed but not in despair. |
✖ Via Bible, 2 Corinthians 4:8: As quoted in the third installment of Errol Morris’ essay on anosognosia (published in The New York Times). Part 3 is all about the debilitating stroke President Woodrow Wilson suffered on October 1919 and his subsequent refusal to acknowledge that there was something wrong with him. Morris tells the story: For Levin, Wilson’s inability to perceive his own incapacity had truly devastating consequences for the nation and world he helped to lead. Perhaps even more troublingly, the reaction to Wilson’s anosognosia on the part of his close associates raises the possibility of an even more problematic impairment — a social anosognosia. Can a group of people, perhaps even society at large, devolve into a state of destructive cluelessness?
Wilson expressed it best of all. On hearing the news of the Senate vote — essentially, the end of the League fight — Wilson asked Grayson to read a verse from the Bible, 2 Corinthians 4:8:We are troubled on every side, yet not distressed; we are perplexed but not in despair. Wilson then said, “If I were not a Christian, I think I should go mad, but my faith in God holds me to the belief that He is in some way working out his plan through human perversity and mistakes.”[52]
Amen. (more) |
• Jun 28, 2010 link notes tagged:
communication
cognitive bias
cognition
anosognosia
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 | We go through life mishearing and misseeing and misunderstanding so that the stories we tell ourselves will add up. Trial lawyers push this human tendency to a higher level. They are playing for higher stakes than we are playing for when we tinker with actuality in order to transform the tale told by an idiot into an orderly, self-serving narrative. |
✖ Via The New Yorker: “Iphigenia in Forest Hill” by Janet Malcolm, May 3rd, 2010, p. 38 An excerpt taken from the fascinating (really) account of Mazoltuv Borukhova’s Trial. The way Malcolm’s puts it could be used, I think, to illustrate the existential implication of “cognitive dissonance”. Janet Malcolm : “(born 1934) is an American writer and journalist on staff at The New Yorker magazine. She is the author of Psychoanalysis: The Impossible Profession (1981), In the Freud Archives (1984) and The Journalist and the Murderer (1990).” (wikipedia) |
• May 10, 2010 link notes tagged:
art
technology
communication
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narrative
representation
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loser
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cognition
cognitive dissonance
journalism
 | Cognitive dissonance is an uncomfortable feeling caused by holding two contradictory ideas simultaneously. The theory of cognitive dissonance proposes that people have a motivational drive to reduce dissonance by changing their attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors, or by justifying or rationalizing them. It is one of the most influential and extensively studied theories in social psychology. […] The most famous case in the early study of cognitive dissonance was described by Leon Festinger and others in the book When Prophecy Fails. The authors infiltrated a group that was expecting the imminent end of the world on a certain date. When that prediction failed, the movement did not disintegrate, but grew instead, as members vied to prove their orthodoxy by recruiting converts. |
✖ Via Wikipedia: “Cognitive dissonance” Learn more about Leon Festinger and his famous book When Prophecy Fails |
• May 07, 2010 link notes tagged:
science
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 | Ethical issues aside, the banks also did poorly at their core job, which is managing risk. And, while there are plenty of honest, capable people in finance, the ease with which investors looked past Wall Street’s failings seems like a classic case of what the social psychologist Leon Festinger called “cognitive dissonance.” Festinger argued that when beliefs come into conflict with reality we think up explanations that shape reality to our beliefs, rather than vice versa. He used the example of the Millerites, a millenarian religious sect that came to believe that Jesus Christ would return to earth on October 22, 1844. He didn’t. But not all the Millerites abandoned their faith. Many set about constructing elaborate rationalizations to justify their belief, arguing that Christ had returned spiritually, or that the event had occurred in Heaven, if not on earth. Similarly, when people’s faith in Wall Street as an honest broker, a smart allocator of capital, and a path to personal wealth was disappointed, they managed to explain things away. |
✖ Via The New Yorker: “Déjà Vu” by James Surowiecki, May 3rd, 2010, p. 25 About James Surowiecki: “James Surowiecki has been a staff writer at The New Yorker since 2000. He writes The Financial Page. Surowiecki came to The New Yorker from Slate, where he wrote the Moneybox column. He has also been a contributing editor at Fortune and a staff writer at Talk. Previously, he was the business columnist for New York magazine. He has contributed to The Wall Street Journal, Wired, the New York Times Magazine, the Washington Post, and Lingua Franca, and has written on subjects ranging from Silicon Valley to college basketball.” (more) More importantly, James Surowiecki is the author of The Wisdom of Crowds (2004) |
• May 03, 2010 link notes tagged:
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finance
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 | The Fundamental cause of the trouble is that in the modern world the stupid are cocksure while the intelligent are full of doubt. |
✖ Via “The Triumph of Stupidity” by Bertrand Russell, in Mortals and Others, Taylor & Francis, [1933]2009, p. 238 This phenomenon was demonstrated in a series of experiments performed by Justin Kruger and David Dunning and is now known as the Dunning-Kruger effect: “The Dunning–Kruger effect is a cognitive bias in which “people reach erroneous conclusions and make unfortunate choices but their incompetence robs them of the metacognitive ability to realize it”. The unskilled therefore suffer from illusory superiority, rating their own ability as above average, much higher than in actuality; by contrast, the highly skilled underrate their abilities, suffering from illusory inferiority. This leads to a perverse result where less competent people will rate their own ability higher than more competent people. It also explains why actual competence may weaken self-confidence because competent individuals falsely assume that others have an equivalent understanding. “Thus, the miscalibration of the incompetent stems from an error about the self, whereas the miscalibration of the highly competent stems from an error about others.” (wikipedia) They also hypothesized that with a typical skill which humans may possess in greater or lesser degree […]
incompetent individuals fail to recognize genuine skill in others” (wikipedia) This is quite exactly the definition Errol Morris gave to “stupidity” a few days ago via his Twitter account: “Apropos of nothing. My definition of a stupid person. A stupid person is a person who treats a smart person as though they’re stupid.” (Twitter) UPDATE : looks like someone told Errol : “Someone compared my definition of a stupid person to the Dunning-Kruger Effect, http://bit.ly/agqBDz. (I am deeply flattered.)” (Twitter) |
• Apr 20, 2010 link notes tagged:
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Dunning-Kruger
 | An empirical test of ideas proposed by Martin Heidegger shows the great German philosopher to be correct: Everyday tools really do become part of ourselves. The findings come from a deceptively simple study of people using a computer mouse rigged to malfunction. The resulting disruption in attention wasn’t superficial. It seemingly extended to the very roots of cognition. “The person and the various parts of their brain and the mouse and the monitor are so tightly intertwined that they’re just one thing,” said Anthony Chemero, a cognitive scientist at Franklin & Marshall College. “The tool isn’t separate from you. It’s part of you.” Chemero’s experiment, published March 9 in Public Library of Science, was designed to test one of Heidegger’s fundamental concepts: that people don’t notice familiar, functional tools, but instead “see through” them to a task at hand, for precisely the same reasons that one doesn’t think of one’s fingers while tying shoelaces. The tools are us. |
✖ Via Wired Science: “Your Computer Really Is a Part of You” by Brandon Keim, March 9, 2010 The study “A Demonstration of the Transition from Ready-to-Hand to Unready-to-Hand” by Dobromir G. Dotov, Lin Nie, Anthony Chemero is available online (PDF). The “fondamental concept” to which Chemero is referring is the concept of “readiness-to-hand”. Heidegger explains this concept in section 15 of his book Being and Time : “The Being of the Entities Encountered in the Environment” (see Google Books). To understand this concept, one can get help from Wikipedia, from an online Glossary of Terms in Being and Time (edited by Roderick Munday, last updated in March 2009) and from Dean Heckles’ blog (Heckle “is a social–cognitive scientist and a PhD student at Stanford” and he specifically chose to name his blog… “Ready-to-hand” : great introduction to the concept if you’re into technology or communication or media studies). For a good overview of what’s at stakes today when it comes to our relationship to technology, one should read the “General Introduction” of the first book of the Technics and Time trilogy by Bernard Stiegler. The book has been translated from French by Richard Beardsworth and George Collins. The “General Introduction” which run from page 1 to 18 is available via Google Books. Previously on Skandalon: cognition and media ecology. |
• Mar 10, 2010 link notes reblogged from chrbutler [via] tagged:
technology
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media
philosophy
cognition
Heidegger
theory
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ecology